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Abstract 
Ever since the credit turmoil took hold in the summer 2007 financial markets have been 
on the brink. Volatility in asset returns and correlations have been high and investors’ 
view on the underlying market fundamentals equally as fickle. Within that market 
context, this paper provides strong evidence for the idea of carry trading currencies as 
risk sentiment gauges in the market. Using daily returns from 2006 to May 2008 it is 
shown how traditional carry trading currency crosses (mainly JPY and CHF crosses) 
exhibit strong negative correlation and beta values with three key equity indices. This 
paper furthermore shows how this relationship, in relation to specific currency pairs, has 
been particularly strong since the advent of the credit crisis. Finally, this paper also 
homes in on the idea of carry trading currencies as means of hedging equity returns and 
fluctuations on a daily basis. At an initial glance such relationships are however bound to 
be highly spurious. As such, this paper also attempts to qualify its findings in a more 
general and solid empirical context. 
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1.0 Introduction 
One of the most vexing features of today’s international financial markets is the carry 
trade phenomenon which exploits wide global interest rate differentials to earn the 
spread between low yielding and high yielding currencies. Carry trading consequently 
violates one of the parity conditions of international currency markets; the uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP). The UIP states that the expected change in the spot rate must 
reflect the interest differential between the two currencies. The theory predicts that the 
country with the high interest rate will see its currency depreciate (i.e. as it is assumed 
ex ante that the higher interest rate is a compensation for this depreciation). In formal 
terms: 
( ) (1 ) / (1 )h fE S i i∆ = + +  
Where 
,h fi i are interest rates in home and foreign respectively. Under the conditions of 
the UIP, the interest rate differential should thus be exactly offset by a change in the 
spot rate over the investment period in question. In this regard, the mechanics of the 
trade are fairly simply and in fact also self-fulfilling, if investors expect the UIP to be 
consistently violated. Consequently, the pursuit of carry trade will tend to keep low 
yielding currencies from appreciating against high yielding currencies since the 
aforementioned are being sold in the carry trade transaction itself. Moreover, many 
investors don’t actually perform carry trades per se but simply latch on to the trade in the 
sense that they, in the spot market,  sell the most common funding carry trade 
currencies (CHF and JPY) against the most common (and liquid) high yielders.  
It is clear that such activity cannot be expected to create positive returns on a consistent 
basis and periods of volatility and sudden reversals of asset prices can prove 
devastating for carry trade investors since positions are often highly leveraged. 
Nevertheless, and given the lingering persistence of wide global interest rate 
differentials some scholars have attempted to account for the ability to make consistent 
profits from carry trading. In Olmo & Pilbeam (2008) carry trading is however not found 
to yield excess returns for the most common carry trading crosses. Curiously, the 
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authors do find excess returns in the context of the GBP/USD cross which is somewhat 
odd given that interest rate differentials between the US and UK tend to be significantly 
narrower than other potentially more ‘juicy’ trades.’ Regarding the UIP in general, Bilson 
(1981) is often referred to as the initial study to reject the hypothesis, but Also Meese 
and Rogoff (1983) and Longworth (1981) provide evidence to reject it. However, the 
evidence against the UIP is not entirely uniform. Chinn and Meredith (2004) manage to 
differentiate the conclusions from the main bulk of the literature. In their 2004 IMF staff 
paper, they consequently find that the UIP holds over longer sample horizons. 
Furthermore, they show how failure of UIP to hold in the short run can be attributed to 
the interaction between shocks on the exchange rate market and endogenous monetary 
policy reactions.  
This paper does not embark on an attempt to qualify these studies but rather assume, 
ex ante, that carry trading exists as an integral part of market practice and discourse.1 
The remarks above opens up the door for an investigation of one of the interesting 
derivative effects from carry trading activity. One question which thus seems interesting 
is the extent to which carry trading activity as measured by movements in the most 
common funding currencies can say something about general market conditions. Clearly 
and assuming that carry trading does not create positive returns on an universally 
consistent basis it would be interesting to gauge the extent to which shifts in ‘carry 
trading behavior’ coincides with other changes in the market. This is exactly what this 
paper sets out to examine in the context of the credit turmoil which, since August 2007, 
have crippled liquidity and sent shivers through financial markets. 
Section one presents the theoretical and conceptual framework, section two presents 
the theoretical operationalization, estimation and presentation of results, section three 
discusses the results and section four concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 As such, it is of less importance to the conclusions of this paper that carry trading works than it is important to 
assume that investors act according to the tenets of carry trading.  
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1.0 Theory and Conceptual Framework 
Since the end of July 2007 equity markets across the global have weakened significantly 
and most investors and market sages do not believe that the bottom has been reached 
yet.  
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In the context of the credit turmoil, this has lead to a market discourse surrounding 
unwinding of risky carry trade positions. The key element in this discourse is how the 
CHF and JPY, as primary funding currencies, are being coined as risk sentiment 
gauges, and thus measures of risk in the market place. The unwinding effect in this 
regard would then be conjured by investors’ and traders’ abandonment of highly 
leveraged spot market positions against the CHF and JPY. One way to operationalize 
this would be to narrate the CHF and JPY as the famous canaries whose demise were 
used by coal miners in the 19th century Britain to gauge when it was time to get out of 
the mine due to the presence of toxic gasses. In this way, CHF and JPY crosses can 
equally be seen as canaries in the context of financial markets whereby a sudden spike 
of volatility or a downward correction in risky assets is followed by an appreciation of the 
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funding carry trade currencies as positions are unwound. Formally, the mechanics of 
such movements would suggest a negative correlation between the CHF and JPY and 
risky assets. Moreover, this would also suggest that we should have observed a 
strengthening across the board of the low yielding currencies since August 2007. This 
however is not uniformly so, as can be seen below.  
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As can readily be observed, the beginning of the credit turmoil has seen significant 
divergence between the JPY and CHF crosses. Yet, this is merely if we look at the 
levels of the time series. If we look at the daily trend there thus seems to be 
considerable co movement. In fact, if we home in on the two graphs above even a scant 
glance suggest a negative correlation between equities and low yielding currencies. It is 
exactly this tendency which is of interest in the present context.      
Notional evidence of such market dynamics is easy to find. Daily readership of 
Bloomberg’s financial news stream will thus often present investors and other market 
participants with headlines such as Yen Falls as Asian Stock Gains Boost Confidence in 
Carry Trades2, which is indicative of the relationship described above. Moreover and 
apart from an account of the theatricals of financial markets such reports also highlight 
two other points. First of all, it indicates that the argument upon which this paper builds 
its case is already formalized in the daily market discourse. Secondly, it suggests that 
                                                 
2
 Stanley White and Kim-Mai Cutler (2008) – Yen Falls as Asian Stock Gains Boost Confidence in Carry Trades, 
16th June 2008 Bloomberg News Article.  
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the relationship is one which, at the very least, can be tracked on a daily or short term 
frequency basis.        
If notional evidence suggests that funding currencies in the carry trade are risk 
gauges in the market place how could this be operationalized?  One way would simply 
be to treat it as an interesting curiosity. However, in light of the fact that the dynamics 
seem more than notional, and in light of the suggested negative correlation between 
currency crosses and risky assets another theoretical approach could also be 
interesting.  
 
Within the context of international portfolio allocation one of the main tenets is to go 
international. Countless studies have shown that even taking into account the higher 
degree of risk as per reference to variance of exchange rates adjusted return it still pays 
off to diversify internationally; for an extensive literature review see Edwin J. Elton et al. 
(2007; 7th edition, chapter 12). The argument for international diversification is 
traditionally formalized through studies of correlations between international equity 
indices. The point is that considerable gains from diversification can be obtained by 
exploiting the relatively low correlation coefficients across stock indices from other 
countries. In Edwin J. Elton et al. (2007) the reported correlation coefficients between 
international equity indices vary between 0.35 and 0.40 depending on the study, and 
thus time period, surveyed. This sounds awfully good then; but there is a rub.   
 
While it is doubtlessly true that international diversification is commendable, evidence 
also suggests that in times of trouble where investors would strongly demand the 
benefits from international diversification those very same benefits tend to evaporate. 
Consequently, Zimmerman et al. (2003) manage to pour cold water on the benefits of 
international diversification. Not only do the authors detail how stock market volatility is 
higher in down periods (bad spawn more volatility than comparable good news). But 
more importantly, they show that down periods when volatility is high and when 
economic activity is shrinking also is associated with a significant increase in correlation 
amongst international securities. It is exactly this effect which decreases the benefits 
from international diversification in periods where international investors crave it the 
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most. Investors and pundits following the credit turmoil as it has ravaged across markets 
since the summer 2007 will know these facts first hand; or as the adage goes; 
sometimes, everything is correlated.    
 
From a general perspective one could also argue that as the capital markets of the world 
become ever more integrated the benefits derived from international diversification will 
tend to be suppressed. In a recent contribution though, Sarno and De Santis (2008) 
provide valuable differentiation to this claim. Two conclusions stand out. One is derived 
from the authors’ construction of a portfolio framework to show that while diversification 
matters, the way it is done even more so. From the point of view of a US equity investor, 
it is shown how a careful choice of a few foreign stock indices is better than choosing a 
global portfolio. The second conclusion is of distinct interest to the query of this paper. 
The authors thus opens up the door for a rigorous study of what co-movements across 
asset classes might mean for international diversification. Specifically, in the context of 
equities and exchange rates Sarno and De Santis (2008) latch on to the principle of 
uncovered equity return parity which was explored in Hau and Rey (2004 and 2006) as 
well as Cappiello and De Santis (2007). The formal conceptualization of this is that 
higher returns on domestic equity market are associated with a depreciation of the home 
currency. This is has a whiff of the argument presented above about it although the 
distinction between domestic and foreign is not the same.  
 
This paper studies daily returns within a, for traditional empirical purposes, relatively 
short period. This paper attempts nonetheless to insert itself within the conceptual 
framework noted above by asking the following question. To what extent can the idea of 
carry trading currencies as risk sentiment gauges be formalized and does this indicate a 
way to hedge daily equity returns?  
 
Coupled with the objective to show how carry trade currencies act as risk sentiment 
gauges in the markets it is towards this question the investigation now turns.  
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2.0 Theory and Empirical Results 
Thomson Datastream was used to pull data on 7 currency pairs considered to be 
traditional carry trade crosses. Of the seven, two CHF crosses and five JPY crosses 
have been used.3 Furthermore three major stock indices from three main regions in the 
form of the SP500, the Nikkei 225 and the DAX 30 were chosen as the market(s).The 
sample period and anatomy is interesting in this regard. A relatively short term 
perspective was consequently chosen. The data series consists of daily values (returns) 
of the seven currency crosses and the three stock market indices from 01-02-2006 to 
05-22-2008 of a total of 623 observations. These data sets form the basis of the 
estimation below.  
 
Within the realms of finance there are essentially two ways to operationalize the benefits 
and anatomy of diversification. One is through simple cross-correlation analysis where a 
correlation coefficient of 1 signifies zero diversification benefit over to a coefficient of -1 
signifying the perfect ‘hedge’ or diversification asset. Following the themes outlined 
above, the key for investors is to construct a portfolio of assets with as low correlations 
as possible to obtain the maximum amount of diversification. The specific point to note 
in this regard is that in periods of significant volatility, correlations between equities tend 
to shoot up. This negates the benefits from volatility in a market context where it is 
craved the most by investors. In order to conceptualize the results and the idea of carry 
trade currency crosses as negative beta assets or risk gauges, the correlation matrix of 
the three stock markets can be compared to the corresponding matrix including the 
currency crosses (see appendix)  
 
As can be observed, an equity portfolio consisting solely of three stock market indices in 
question have not provided much diversification; save perhaps for the Nikkei 225 and 
SP500/DAX 30 which appear to offer a fair degree of diversification benefits to each 
other. However, if we peer towards the correlation matrix between the currency crosses 
and the three stock market indices the tableau seems to constitute a fund manager’s 
wet dream, almost exclusively with negative coefficients. The mechanics here are quite 
                                                 
3
 USD/JPY, NZD/JPY, AUD/JPY, EUR/JPY, EUR/CHF, GBP/JPY and GBP/CHF.  
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simple. Given the fact that the currencies are quoted directly (i.e. amount of high yielding 
currency to buy one low yielding currency) the negative coefficients strongly underpin 
the notion of carry trade currencies as canaries in the coalmine relative to risk sentiment 
in the market place. The formal rationale is that during times of heightening risk aversion 
the JPY and CHF strengthens while equities fall4.     
  
Another and somewhat more rigorous approach is to assume the tenets of the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by William Sharpe Sharpe (1964). In this 
framework, the degree of co-movement between two assets (the market and a single 
asset is operationalized through simple linear regression analysis (OLS) where the 
market is dependent variable with the single asset as independent variable. Formally, 
the CAPM takes the following form in the simplified version:  
 
2
m f
i f im
m
R R
R R σ
σ
 −
= +   
 
 
 
And in an even simpler form where the beta value is visible; the beta is defined 
accordingly here as 2im
m
σ
σ
. 
 
( )i f i m fR R R Rβ= + −  
 
The CAPM famously states that the return on asset i equals the risk free rate plus the 
market premium. The CAPM has consequently fathered one of the most fundamental 
measures of risk in modern financial analysis; the beta ( )β  which measures the 
covariance between any risky asset and its market (its unique and non diversifiable risk). 
In this paper, the CAPM framework cannot be directly applied for the obvious reason 
that currency crosses do not, as such, exist within the markets used (i.e. the SP500, 
Nikkei 225, and DAX 30). However, the rationale of the CAPM can still be applied in the 
                                                 
4
 The only exceptions here would be the NZD/JPY and AUD/JPY to the SP500 according to the correlation matrix.  
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sense that a beta-coefficient can still be estimated. Thus, the estimation of the currency 
crosses’ beta shall be approximated by the following equation for a total of 21 
regressions (3 stock market indices and 7 currency crosses).  
 
t t tequity currency uα β∆ = + ∆ +  
 
Where equity is a stock market index and currency one of the 7 currency crosses used 
to formalize the argument.  All variables and parameters are in % changes (daily 
returns) to correct ex ante for stationarity problems. In this expression, the estimated 
parameter tβ  will be the main result to gauge. Given the theme of the present study and 
the fact that all currencies are quoted directly one would expect negative signs. The 
added benefit from this approach is also that, contrary to the correlation analysis, the 
strength of the relationship can be measured as per reference to the regression’s 
coefficient of determination 2( )R  and its corresponding F value to measure statistical 
significance. In the following table, the figure outside the brackets will be the estimated 
beta-coefficient while the figure inside the brackets its associated coefficient of 
determination. The asterisks denote level of significance in all the subsequent tables.5 
As such, for the USD/JPY to the SP500 the estimated beta is -0.34, its 2( )R equal to 0.05 
and the * denotes significance at 1%.  
 
                                                 
5
 * for 1%, ** for 5 %, and *** for 10% 
6
 The sample period for the GBP/JPY begins at 06-08-2006 and thus must be taken with a pinch of salt relative to the 
other currencies.  
 
  SP500    Nikkei 225      DAX 30 
USD/JPY -0.34(0.05)* -0.49(0.048)* -0.63(0.116)* 
 
   
NZD/JPY 0.1(0.016)* -0.43(0.126)* -0.098(0.01)** 
 
   
AUD/JPY 0.1(0.012)* -0.61(0.226)* -0.14(0.017)* 
 
   
EUR/JPY -0.17(0.013)* -0.88(0.164)* -0.58(0.106)* 
 
   
EUR/CHF -0.5(0.02)* -2.35(0.214)* -1.76(0.182)* 
    
GPB/JPY6 -0.34(0.067)* -0.55(0.088)* -0.73(0.23)* 
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The first rather interesting result is that although the 2R values differ significantly most of 
the returned values are highly significant save GBP/CHF for the SP500. For the SP500 
most 2R  values are not particularly strong indicating that, over the sample period in 
question, carry trade crosses have not been very strong indicatiors of the movements in 
SP500. This picture changes decisively with regards to the Nikkei 225. Not only are the 
estimated 2R values larger but also the beta parameters are more extreme. One 
interesting result here must clearly be the coefficient estimated for EUR/CHF at -2.35 
with a corresponding 2R of 0.214. Moving over to the DAX 30 EUR/CHF and GBP/JPY in 
particular have strong explanatory power. In general, Euro crosses as well as the 
GBP/JPY seem to provide the strongest foundation for the argument that carry trade 
crosses act as risk sentiment gauges in the market place.       
 
Yet, the results are from the whole sample period.  
 
Given the conceptual foundation noted, one should expect the correlations to have 
grown stronger in the context of the turmoil which settled on financial markets during the 
summer of 2007. It would be interesting then, to see whether a change has occurred in 
the context of recent events in financial markets. In order to pinpoint a break in the 
series August the 1st 2007 is defined as the ‘beginning’ of the financial market turmoil. 
Period one will then be defined as 01-02-2006 to 07-31-2007 and period two as 08-01-
2007 to 05-22-2008.  
 
First we look at correlations (appendix). Interestingly, the conclusions reached by 
Zimmerman et al. (2003) for equity returns do not seem to come off as strong as one 
would have expected. For example, the cross correlation between DAX 30 and SP500 is 
lower after the credit turmoil grabbed hold. In general however, the correlations between 
    
 
 
GBP/CHF -0.057(0.000) -0.97(0.119)* -0.54(0.055)* 
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the three indices are quite high both in terms of the full sample period as well as the two 
sub periods.  
 
More interesting in the present context are the values for the currency crosses relative to 
the three equity indices. Except for one currency pair (GBP/CHF to the SP500) the signs 
remain the same over the two periods. It can also be observed with clarity how the 
negative correlations are much stronger in period 2. This lends evidence to the idea of 
carry trading currencies as ‘canaries in the coal mine’ for global risk sentiment as well 
as, by consequence, their profile as negative beta assets. Especially, the USD/JPY pair 
has seen its negative correlation coefficient spike significantly.  
 
Moving on to the estimated beta values, the same approach is deployed by splitting up 
the data set in two periods.  
 
 
Betas (Period 1, 01-02-2006 to 07-31-2007) 
    
 
   SP500    Nikkei 225   DAX 30 
USD/JPY 
  -0.089(0.00)   -0.11(0.00)   -0.2(0.01)* 
 
   
NZD/JPY 
  0.014(0.00)   -0.183(0.02)***   -0.15(0.02)* 
 
   
AUD/JPY 
  0.025(0.00)   -0.43(0.074)*   -0.15(0.01)** 
 
   
EUR/JPY 
  -0.15(0.01)**   -0,5(0.04)*   -0,41(0.04)* 
 
   
EUR/CHF 
  -0,6(0.03)*   -1,65(0.09)*   -1,59(0.11)* 
 
   
GBP/JPY 
  -0,21(0.02)***   -0,3(0.02)*   -0,56(0.08)* 
 
   
GBP/CHF 
  -0,18(0.00)***   -0,7(0.05)*   -0,47(0.03)* 
 
 
 
Betas (Period 2, 08-01-2007 to 05-22-2008) 
    
 
      SP500       Nikkei 225           DAX 30 
USD/JPY 
      -0.56(0.11)* -0.79(0.12)*       -0.96(0.31)* 
 
   
NZD/JPY 0.15(0.04)* -0.56(0.25)* -0.06(0.00) 
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AUD/JPY 0.13(0.02)** -0,69(0.36)*      -0,13(0.02)** 
 
   
EUR/JPY -0.19(0.02)*** -1.11(0.30)* -0.68(0.19)* 
 
   
EUR/CHF -0,42(0.01)*** -2,76(0.34)* -1,86(0.25)* 
 
   
GBP/JPY -0,38(0.09)* -0,62(0.13)* -0,79(0.34)* 
 
   
GBP/CHF 0,018(0.00) -1,11(0.19)* -0,57(0.08)* 
 
 
As with the correlations, even a scant initial glance suggests that a break is present 
around the dawn of the credit crisis. Not all currency pairs reflect this, but the degree of 
change and the range of currencies displaying an increase in negative coefficients and 
2R values merit this initial conclusion. However, in order to test the robustness of this 
initial conclusion a statistical test for structural break is performed below. This will show 
more rigorously which relationships that have decisively or more aptly statistically 
changed.  
 
There are two ways in which structural break can be identified. One is to let the data 
speak for itself. This means that you identify the break by looking at the trend and 
fluctuations in series itself (themselves) independent of a theoretical or rational impetus 
for identifying the break. Another way would be to impose assumptions given an event 
or change of exogenous circumstance which could provoke a structural change in the 
series. By identifying the credit turmoil as the point of reference for the structural break, 
this paper opts for the latter approach. As noted, the structural break is identified ex ante 
as the beginning of the credit turmoil in August 2007 (concretely 01-08-2007). 
This leaves 411 observations in the first period regression and 212 observations 
in the second. The test for structural breaks in the 21 regressions will be carried out in 
line with the method presented in Gujarati (2003)7 and first deployed by Chow (1960); 
i.e. the so-called Chow Test. Assume then the generic regression for the whole period 
as stated above 
 
                                                 
7
 PP. 273-279. 
 14 
t t tequity currency uα β∆ = + ∆ +  
 
As well as the following regressions for period one and two respectively;  
 
 
1 1t t tequity currency uα λ∆ = + ∆ +  and 2 2t t tequity currency uα γ∆ = + ∆ +  
 
 
The mechanics of the Chow Test assumes that t t tα α α= =  in all three estimations8 but 
also more importantly that t t tβ λ γ= = . This last assumption is what we are particularly 
interested in although formally the test cannot explain whether it is the intercept of the 
slope that changes9. The key to perform the Chow Test is to test whether the residual 
sum of squares (RSS) from the original regression is statistically different from the sum 
of the RSS from the two period regressions. Formally, the test is conducted by 
calculating the following F-value:  
 
1 2[ ,( 2 )]
1 2
( ) /
~( ) / ( 2 )
R UR
k n n k
UR
RSS RSS kF F
RSS n n k + −
−
=
+ −
 
 
Where RRSS is the residual sum of squares from the original full sample size regression 
and URRSS is the sum of residual sum of squares from the two separate period 
regressions. 1 2( 2 )n n k+ − is equal to (411+212)-(2*2) = 619 and the critical values of the 
F is 2.30, 3.00 and 4.61 for 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. The null 
is that there is no structural break which means that a significant F-value would indicate 
that a structural break is present as per reference to rejection of the null. In the table 
below the computed F value is shown for all the 21 original regressions.  
                                                 
8
 Although the intercept is of little importance in this present context.  
9
 Dummy variables would be an alternative here.   
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F-Values for Structural Breaks 
 
    
 
SP500      Nikkei 225 DAX 30 
USD/JPY 8.75*      10.35* 15.00* 
 
   
NZD/JPY 3.52**      9.96* 2.05 
 
   
AUD/JPY 2.32***      4,25** 1.12 
 
   
EUR/JPY 1.16      7.79* 2.30***10 
 
   
EUR/CHF 0.58      4.89* 0.00 
    
GPB/JPY 1,10      1,78 1,54 
    
GBP/CHF 2,08      3,34** 0,63 
 
 
As could have been expected, this somewhat more rigorous method differentiates the 
initial conclusion11. The USD/JPY in particular seems to exhibit a strong structural break 
and so do the currency pairs, in general, when regressed on the Nikkei 225. It is 
interesting in this regard to consider that many currency pairs were significant for the 
DAX 30 in both periods. Given the lack of significant structural breaks it suggests that 
the relationship transcends beyond the credit turmoil. In fact, the same conclusion can 
be made in the context of the Nikkei 225 save the fact that the negative relationship has 
clearly strengthened since August 2007. In the SP500’s case only the USD/JPY seems 
to have displayed a structural break whereas the other currency pairs in general (save 
the GBP/JPY) offer little explanatory power relative to the movements of this stock 
index.  
 
3.0 Discussion 
The estimation above presents several interesting results. The results which show carry 
trade currency pairs as negative beta assets seem particularly strong in the context of 
the Nikkei 225 index. This may not in itself vindicate the theory since it may simply be 
                                                 
10
 Barely significant at 10%.  
11
 Although the Chow Test assumes equal variance in the two sub-periods which seems to be somewhat violated 
here. (G)ARCH models could be considered here in order to be more rigorous.   
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replicating the idea that higher equity returns in the domestic market is associated with a 
depreciation of the home currency as showed by other studies. This need not be the 
case though. It is important to note that the present study studies daily returns which are 
quite different than the norm of studying monthly returns. Moreover, it is also clear that if 
we look at the full sample period, not only the JPY crosses show negatively significant 
beta values to the Nikkei 225 but so do the EUR/CHF and GBP/CHF. This strong result 
is echoed with the DAX 30 where strong results are presented over the entire sample 
period with the AUD/JPY and NZD/JPY as the only exceptions. In relation to the SP500 
the results were somewhat more meager with the notable exception of the USD/JPY 
which has exhibited a strong structural break around the summer 2007. In overall terms, 
one could distinguish between the currency pairs by looking at their respective 
coefficients of determination. In this way, some of the currency pairs clearly offer a 
higher degree of explanatory power and thus, by derivative, a more believable act as 
negative beta assets. Examples here would be (GBP/JPY and GBP/CHF to the DAX 30 
and EUR/CHF and AUD/JPY to the Nikkei 225).  
 
Here, at the brink of the paper, (at least) two overall questions impose. The first is the 
question of structural stability of beta values or more specifically the sign of the 
estimated parameters. The second is the dodgier question of causality between 
currency pair and equity index.  
 
On the first question this paper clearly falls outside the norm in its study of daily returns 
over a relatively short time span. Considerable ink has been devoted by finance 
scholars in determining the estimation period which best approximates a stabile beta 
value. At a first glance such studies are not directly replicable in the present context. As 
such, the CAPM was not explicitly used but more so its theoretical foundation to derive a 
simple regression analysis framework to operationalize the argument. Traditionally 
however, studies have shown that 4-6 years (about 300 observations with monthly 
returns) provide the strongest result Alexander and Chervany (1980). It has also been 
shown how extreme betas are shown to be less stable over time than betas drifting 
closer to the mean Alexander and Chervany (1980). These methodological glitches 
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notwithstanding, it is interesting in the context of the present study. As such, one should 
be careful making general extrapolations on the basis of the findings above. On the 
other hand though, and given the strength of the results, effort should be put into pinning 
down which of these relationships hold up for scrutiny over time.  
 
Turning to the issue of causality, I really rather would like to leave it alone all together. 
One can consequently always quibble about causality in the context of statistical 
analysis even to such an extent to make the actual results secondary to the inquiry. This 
mistake will not be made here. Still, the approach chosen above does seem to run 
counter to what could be described as the intuitive causal relationship. In the 
regressions conducted above the causal relationship was estimated in the form of how 
the change in the currency pairs explain the change in equity indices. This runs counter 
to the market discourse on the subject but it was a necessary approach in order to 
express the hypothetical beta values of the currency pairs. Granger causality tests 
(Granger 1969) could be performed to formally ascertain the arrows of causality but in 
essence, the Granger test itself says very little about what really constitutes causality 
more than it merely provides a binary analysis of what affects what.  
 
4.0 Conclusion 
The principles of carry trading and how to bet against the patchy theory of uncovered 
interest rate parity are well known. Moreover, carry trading and the effect of investors 
pursuing it, have almost turned in to an urban legend on financial markets where many 
derivative effects of ‘carry trading behavior’ are cited. This paper has attempted to 
scrutinize one of the most widespread of these. It has consequently been shown how 
the JPY and CHF, often cited as the traditional funding currencies in carry trades, exhibit 
strong negative correlations and beta values to equities (SP500, Nikkei 225 and DAX 
30). This lends evidence to the idea of the CHF and JPY as risk sentiment gauges. A 
conclusion important to this argument was also that many negative beta values and their 
explanatory power increase in the context of an exogenous event which brings volatility 
and uncertainty to the market.  
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Regarding the potential for investors to use carry trade crosses to hedge equity 
positions the evidence appears strong. An initial glance will thus reveal that most 
currency pairs not only exhibit negative correlations with equities but also how they 
posses significant, in statistical terms, negative beta values. This suggests that investors 
can indeed cover equity positions by buying low yielding currencies in times of volatlity. 
Yet, these conclusions need to be taken with a pinch of salt. First of all, the study is 
based on daily returns which means that only investors of a certain pedigree would be 
able to benefit from these correlations (i.e. investors trading on a daily basis). Moreover, 
it is not certain that such correlations can be assumed to persist. In this regard it is 
important to watch the currency pairs with significant negative beta values and relatively 
high coefficients of determinations across the two periods (GBP/JPY and GBP/CHF to 
the DAX 30 and EUR/CHF and AUD/JPY to the Nikkei 225).  
 
Further studies on this topic should attempt to widen the time span of the sample to 
gauge the general validity of the results as well as attempt to make forecasts of daily 
exchange rate and/or stock returns based on the relationships cited above.  
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6.0 Appendix  – Cross Correlations  
 
Cross Correlations (full period, correlations of level form) 
 
    
 
SP500 Nikkei 225 DAX 30 
SP500 1,00 0,44 0,93 
 
   
Nikkei 225 0,44 1,00 0,21 
 
   
DAX 30 0,93 0,21 1,00 
 
Cross Correlations (full period, correlations of % daily changes) 
    
 
SP500 Nikkei 225 DAX 30 
USD/JPY -0,2245 -0,2198 -0,3409 
 
   
NZD/JPY 0,1278 -0,3543 -0,1005 
 
   
AUD/JPY 0,1118 -0,4752 -0,1338 
 
   
EUR/JPY -0,1137 -0,4053 -0,3257 
 
   
EUR/CHF -0,1419 -0,4630 -0,4264 
    
GBP/JPY -0,2578 -0,2973 -0,4799 
    
GBP/CHF -0,0293 -0,3463 -0,2365 
 
 
And for the separate periods …  
 
Cross Correlations (Period 1, 01-02-2006 to 07-31-2007) 
    
 
SP500 Nikkei 225 DAX 30 
SP500 1,0000 0,8317 0,9764 
 
   
Nikkei 225 0,8317 1,0000 0,8494 
 
   
DAX 30 0,9764 0,8494 1,0000 
    
    
 
SP500 Nikkei 225 DAX 30 
USD/JPY -0,0654 -0,0509 -0,1036 
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NZD/JPY 0,0172 -0,1368 -0,1310 
 
   
AUD/JPY 0,0257 -0,2725 -0,1066 
 
   
EUR/JPY -0,1015 -0,2052 -0,1930 
 
   
EUR/CHF -0,1797 -0,2984 -0,3328 
    
GBP/JPY -0,1463 -0,1378 -0,2815 
    
GBP/CHF -0,0943 -0,2143 -0,1651 
 
 
Cross Correlations (Period 2, 08-01-2007 to 05-22-2008) 
 
 
SP500 Nikkei 225 DAX 30 
SP500 1,0000 0,9293 0,8998 
 
   
Nikkei 225 0,9293 1,0000 0,8672 
 
   
DAX 30 0,8998 0,8672 1,0000 
    
    
 
SP500 Nikkei 225 DAX 30 
USD/JPY -0,3282 -0,3533 -0,5536 
 
   
NZD/JPY 0,1908 -0,5020 -0,0759 
 
   
AUD/JPY 0,1546 -0,6032 -0,1549 
 
   
EUR/JPY -0,1189 -0,5430 -0,4310 
 
   
EUR/CHF -0,1186 -0,5793 -0,5042 
    
GBP/JPY -0,2956 -0,3589 -0,5833 
    
GBP/CHF 0,0093 -0,4311 -0,2879 
 
 
 
 
